Criminalising vulnerability: Protecting ‘vulnerable’ children and punishing ‘wicked’ mothers by Singh, SF
1 
 
Criminalising vulnerability: Protecting ‘vulnerable’ children and punishing 
‘wicked’ mothers 
Abstract 
This article aims to uncover how, in attempting to ameliorate the vulnerability of 
children, the offence of ‘causing or allowing the death of the child’ criminalises 
abused mothers. It explores how, in the courtroom, tropes of female criminality and 
constructs of the ‘bad’ mother are mobilised in ways that are both gendered and 
‘classed’. The effect is to silence female defendants, deprive their actions of context, 
and deny them agency. This argument has implications for assessing the moral and 
legal culpability of abused women who fail to protect their children, because it shifts 
the focus onto how the abuser has exploited and exacerbated the vulnerability of 
both mother and child. This approach also challenges law’s preoccupation with 
scrutinising (and punishing) women who do not adhere to a glorified, middle class 
ideal of motherhood. More broadly, by focusing on the context of a woman’s alleged 
‘failure’, there opens a space within legal discourse to refute the characterisation of 
female criminality as being either ‘mad’ or ‘bad’, and of women who engage in 
criminal behaviour as being either ‘virgins’ or ‘whores’. Finally, in focusing on 
vulnerability as a universal and unavoidable part of the human experience, gendered 
assumptions of autonomy and the self/other dichotomy are challenged. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the potential of vulnerability theory to problematise the criminal 
offence of ‘causing or allowing the death of a child’, by uncovering the gendered 
discourse that surrounds this crime. The offence, which carries a sentence of up to 
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fourteen years imprisonment, was introduced in England and Wales as part of the 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act (2004, section 5).  It was  amended in 
2012 to encompass cases where a child survives despite suffering ‘serious’ harm.1 
The article challenges the use of  the ‘allowing’ element of the offence to prosecute 
mothers who are themselves subject to abuse.  
Because failure to protect cases are heard in the Crown Court, they are not 
reported, meaning that knowledge of these cases is limited to media reports, and 
these are notoriously sensationalist (Goc, 2009; Cunliffe, 2011). In order to 
overcome this limitation, I observed one case -- R v Green & Critchley (unreported, 
2013) -- in its entirety2. My analysis in this article largely focuses on this case as 
representative. I suggest that, while this criminal offence places pressure on  women 
to incriminate their abusive partners, the legal discourse surrounding failure to 
protect paradoxically silences those same women. In this way, the law manipulates, 
exacerbates and ultimately criminalises their vulnerability. 
Green & Critchley flags up the problems with how this legislation operates in 
practice, and with how failure to protect discourse is infused with an archaic maternal 
ideology, which is itself grounded in notions of femininity and maternity which silence 
mothers who are charged under its provisions (Panko, 1996).  The labelling of these 
women as having failed to meet the demands of maternal ideology in order to 
explain their crimes (and to justify their punishments) leaves no space for women to 
share their complicated lived experiences with the courts. In this way, essentialist, 
culturally recognisable stock stories render women’s ‘true’ narratives unknowable. 
This process exacerbates the vulnerability of abused mothers who are charged. It 
denies them agency and allows patriarchal gender ideology to continue 
unchallenged (Cunliffe, 2001; Smart, 1997; Wiest and Duffy, 2013).   
                                                          
1 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims (Amendment) Act 2012  
2 I became aware of this particular case through the national press. A search of the local newspaper (Lancashire Evening Press) gave an 
approximate date as to when the case would start at Preston Crown court (Sessions House) and I then confirmed the exact date with the 
scheduling department at Preston Crown Court. After obtaining permission from the judge (via the court usher), I spent 3 weeks observing 
the case in the area of the court reserved for the press. As I was there for the duration of the case other participants would sometimes 
volunteer their opinions/ interpretations of events, such as police officers, journalists etc. Due to the pace of proceedings it was 
sometimes difficult to note direct quotes whilst observing the behavior and reactions of the defendants, the barristers, the judge etc.  
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Drawing on the work of Martha Fineman, I propose a shift away from maternal 
responsibility (which is the basis of the law as it is currently understood), and 
towards the concept of relational vulnerability. There are several benefits to be 
gained from this move. First, by focusing on how the abuser manipulated and 
exacerbated the vulnerability of mother and child, a relational vulnerability analysis 
shifts attention away from the omissions of the abused woman and towards the 
actions of her abuser. It thereby challenges the attribution of moral responsibility and 
legal culpability, and should result in failure to protect charges being considered 
inappropriate where there is evidence of abuse towards the mother. A relational 
vulnerability approach also grapples with how a defendant can be simultaneously 
vulnerable but nevertheless in possession of agency. As a consequence, the 
criminal law’s need to pathologise and demonise ‘criminal’ women might be 
overcome. Finally, an understanding of vulnerability as a universal aspect of the 
human condition, as proposed by Fineman, challenges the feminisation of 
vulnerability. Not only has this construct been used to deny agency to women, but it 
has perpetuated the myth that ‘invulnerability’ is  both desirable and achievable. 
 
‘You played roulette with her life’ 
On 30th August 2012, a 999 call was made from the family home of Natalie Critchley 
(aged 20), Richard S Green (aged 22), and their two young children. Critchley 
informed the operator that their three year old daughter, Lia, had been suffering from 
a stomach upset. Green then snatched the telephone and told the operator that his 
daughter was not breathing. Arriving three minutes later, the paramedics tried to 
revive Lia, but she was already beyond medical help and was pronounced dead 
shortly after arriving at the Royal Preston Hospital. She had multiple injuries on her 
body and a post mortem found that the cause of death was peritonitis caused by the 
severing of the duodenum. Medical expert witnesses agreed that the injury that 
caused her death could not have been accidental; it would have required ‘great 
force, a violent kick or punch in the stomach or being thrown extremely violently 
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against a hard surface’. Green was charged with two counts: (i) murder; and (ii) 
causing or allowing the death of a child. Critchley was charged with the single count 
of causing or allowing the death of a child. 
When questioned about the events leading up to Lia’s death, Green and 
Critchley each denied perpetrating or witnessing any violent conduct towards their 
daughter. They each stated that Lia had suffered gastrointestinal symptoms for a 
couple of days prior to her death. They had assumed that she was suffering from a 
common childhood stomach upset. When prompted to describe Lia’s last days, 
Green claimed that she had fallen off a swing the day before her death and landed 
on her bottom. However, medical experts discounted the possibility of this event 
causing such extreme blunt force trauma; particularly as, by Green’s own admission, 
Lia was ‘fine’ afterwards and was seen on Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) walking 
home later that day. The experts emphasised that she would not have been able to 
do this after the injury that led to her death. Both parents had also informed 
paramedics, nurses and the police that Lia had been ‘up and about’ a very short time 
before she collapsed, a description which one expert found ‘extremely 
unlikely…almost impossible’. These inconsistencies between the parents’ accounts 
and the medical evidence were central to the trial. 
Green & Critchley  is a typical failure to protect case in that, first, a child died 
in the family home. Second, neither parent would admit responsibility for the death, 
nor would they incriminate one another. The Crown’s case was that Green violently 
attacked Lia, causing her fatal injuries. Critchley, whilst absent at the time of the 
attack, was aware of Green’s violent tendencies due to the abuse she herself 
suffered throughout their relationship. Consequently, she had ‘allowed’ her 
daughter’s death by failing to protect her from Green. Furthermore, the prosecution 
contended that, upon her return to the family home, Critchley knew that Lia had been 
seriously injured but she failed to summon potentially life saving medical assistance 
because of her feckless nature and due to her ‘misguided loyalty’ to her partner. 
Green’s defence was that his daughter was suffering from a stomach bug; she had 
fallen off a swing and then collapsed the following morning; and that he was 
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devastated and baffled by his daughter’s sudden death. Critchley’s defence was that, 
as far as she was aware, her daughter was never physically harmed by Green. She 
believed that Lia was suffering from a stomach upset until the point in time when she 
collapsed. At that moment,  she sought urgent medical assistance. 
 
Protecting children; punishing mothers  
The rationale for adopting failure to protect legislation in England and Wales was to 
close a loophole created by R v Lane & Lane (1986). In that case, which involved the 
death of a child, neither parent would admit responsibility. Neither parent would 
testify against the other and there no evidence which indicated which parent was 
culpable. The Court held that, given the ambiguous circumstances, the case could 
not proceed. This precedent was applied in subsequent cases with similar facts (Law 
Commission, 2003b:1), sparking public outrage and leading child protection groups, 
such as the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), to 
complain that parents were quite literally ‘getting away with murder.’ In 2003, the 
NSPCC published the report which led to the enactment of s 5 of the Act (NSPCC, 
2003). 
In the event of an unexpected child death, where neither parent will admit 
responsibility or incriminate the other, s 5 is said to provide a ‘safety net’. If the 
Crown cannot prove murder or manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, s 5 can 
give rise to an alternative homicide charge. But in Green & Critchley,3 the Crown 
accepted that Critchley was not present when Lia’s injuries were inflicted. However, 
contrary to the Law Commission’s recommendations, s 5 is not limited to 
circumstances where it is unknown which parent inflicted the injury. Instead, the 
provision criminalises any parent (or member of the household) who has failed to 
take ‘reasonable steps’ to protect a child from harm which they ‘had foreseen or 
ought to have foreseen’ (Law Commission, 2003). The objective elements -- 
                                                          




reasonable steps and foreseeability -- leave much to a Court’s discretion, and they 
place a heavy burden on trial judges to ensure that their directions to juries are clear. 
In Green & Critchley, s 5 amounts to a statement of responsibility. It is used to apply 
pressure to women such as Critchley to incriminate their partners and thus help the 
Crown to secure a conviction of murder, as opposed to the lesser offences of 
manslaughter or causing the death of a child. After several weeks in Court, Green 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter and the s 5 charge against Critchley was thrown out. 
In its place was substituted the lesser child cruelty offence of failing to obtain 
appropriate medical attention (Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1 (2)). 
In practice, the offence of failure to protect has been frequently used to 
criminalise women who are themselves victims of abuse (Panko, 1996; Fugate, 
2001). For example, Herring (2007; 2008) highlights the plight of Rebecca Lewis, 
whose partner killed her thirteen month old son. Lewis stayed with this abusive 
partner as he had threatened to kill her if she ended the relationship. 
Notwithstanding this threat, she was convicted, with the Court criticising her for 
‘putting her own interests first, above and beyond that of [her] vulnerable child’. Even 
though she was not present at the scene of the attack, Lewis was still sentenced to 
six years in prison. Similarly, Kirsty Smedley was found guilty of failing to protect her 
two year old son. He died as a result of a violent attack perpetrated by Smedley’s 
partner, Daniel Rigby, while she went to buy cannabis for him. Rigby and Smedley 
were sentenced to seventeen and four years respectively.4 During the trial, it 
emerged that, a couple of weeks prior to the murder, Rigby had been arrested for 
assaulting (head-butting) a pregnant Smedley in public. However, the case against 
him was dropped as a result of an investigation that was ‘plagued by errors’  
(Scheerhout, 2014). 
Thus, a history of domestic violence does not diminish a woman’s 
responsibility for failing to remove a child from the risk of harm by providing an 
explanation and justification for inaction. Rather, in these cases, the Crown argues 
that the more frequent and severe the abuse experienced by the mother, the more 
                                                          
4 R v Rigby & Smedley (unreported, 2012)  
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likely it is that she was aware of her partner’s propensity for violence (Fugate, 2001; 
Herring, 2008: 146). This then ‘proves’ that the harm suffered by the child was 
foreseeable and, ultimately, that the woman failed to take reasonable steps to 
protect her child from the potential threat. As a consequence, the defence may 
decide not to submit evidence of a history of violence against the mother. The 
context in which her actions -- or, more accurately, her omissions -- occurred 
therefore is never articulated in Court. As I shall demonstrate below, this approach 
exacerbates the woman’s vulnerability because the lack of factual context results in 
an increased reliance on age old tropes of female criminality and idealised notions of 
motherhood5. The jury is encouraged by the Crown to interpret a mother’s failure to 
meet this glorified standard of mothering as the justification for the imposition of 
criminal responsibility (on women who are themselves the victims of abuse) (Panko, 
1996; Herring, 2008).  
  
Gendered tropes and the failure to protect 
Tropes are stereotypical ‘stock stories’ grounded in a particular characteristic or 
status. To ‘explain’ female criminality without disrupting gender roles, they offer 
essentialist, culturally recognisable explanations which serve to pathologise women. 
This in turn  justifies the imposition of criminal punishment (Morrissey, 2003). By 
portraying the cause of female deviance as a flaw within the particular woman 
herself, the tropes serve to prevent any understanding of the broader context in 
which a woman might function. The result is the silencing of defendants and the 
denial of women’s agency. Abused women who are charged with failing to protect 
their children are subject to many overlapping and contradictory tropes which result 
from the conflicting ideological preconceptions of them as women, mothers, and 
victims. Despite being grounded in outmoded conceptions of femininity (and 
maternity), these tropes of female criminality continue to resonate in criminal trials 
and they remain influential with juries. For instance, Ballinger (2012) has compared 
                                                          




the 1955 trial of Ruth Ellis, the last woman in England to be hanged, and her 
posthumous appeal in 2003. Despite the gap of forty eight years, the discursive 
tropes mobilised in both the trial and the appeal were strikingly similar. Of course, 
these tropes may be used by the defence to ‘recuperate’ a woman back towards a 
more desirable notion of femininity. Alternatively, they are deployed by the Crown in 
order to distance her from that ideal, thereby making her less sympathetic to judges, 
juries and the wider public (Seal 2010; Cunliffe 2011; Fox and Bell 1996; Nicholson, 
1997). 
The so called ‘mad/bad’ dichotomy dominates discourses of female criminality 
(Allen, 1987). When women commit typically ‘masculine’ crimes, they are ‘doubly 
transgressive’ in that they defy both the law and assigned gender roles (Weare 2013; 
Smart, 1997; Carlen and Worrall 1987).  They are then demonised as bad: so 
monstrously unfeminine as to be ‘other’ to their gender (Nicholson, 1997). By 
contrast, when women commit crimes that are more aligned to perceived gender 
roles, they are pathologised as mad (Coates and Wade, 2004). Mothers such as 
Critchley are characterised as either pathologically bad or mad depending on which 
tropes of faulty femininity are advanced by the defence and prosecution. In Green & 
Critchley, the claims put forward by the Crown centred on apparent hypersexuality, 
duplicity and fecklessness. This resulted in Critchley’s construction as pathologically 
bad and, as a result, as deserving of punishment.  
Morrissey (2003; 23) criticises feminist legal scholars for advancing a third 
trope of victimhood which equally risks denying women agency. She argues that, by 
only engaging with ‘deserving’, sympathetic women who have committed violent 
crime in response to abuse (such as the battered woman who kills her abuser), 
feminist explanations of female deviance perpetuate the idea of women as 
‘pathological victims’. Since pathology is antithetical to responsibility, constructing 
perpetrators as victims of their own physiology means that they cannot be 
considered autonomous agents (Armstrong, 1999; Weait, 2007). This can have 
tactical benefits, including  reduced sentences and even the avoidance of custodial 
sentences altogether (Nicholson, 1995). However, this practical gain for individuals 
9 
 
comes at the expense of the status of women more generally. By playing into 
misogynistic notions of female embodiment, it perpetuates the idea that women are 
too embodied to be considered rational agents (Shildrick, 1997). As a response, 
feminist theorists have made a conscious effort to address unsympathetic female 
defendants who commit theoretically ‘difficult’ violent crimes (Seal, 2010; Fox & Bell, 
1996; Winter, 2002). For example, in her analysis of the trials of serial killers Rose 
West and Myra Hindley, Winter (2002) respects West and Hindley’s agency while 
continuing to challenge the denial of female subjectivity in the courtroom. She 
maintains that it should be the defendants’ actions and omissions on trial, rather than 
their femininity. In Green & Critchley, I would argue that respect for Critchley’s 
agency requires that the Crown’s case be based on facts, such as how she 
downplayed the seriousness of Lia’s condition when summoning medical attention, 
rather than on whether she adhered to a traditional gender role.  
 
Culpable victims: the ‘good’ mother / ‘ideal’ victim dichotomy 
Gender tropes do not only construct transgressive women as pathologically mad or 
bad. In addition, when the alleged transgression involves children, the denial of 
female agency is exacerbated by the use of maternal tropes which derive from 
idealised notions of motherhood. This gives rise to yet another problematic dyad in 
the context of failure to protect cases: the good/bad mother dichotomy. In these 
cases, mothers can never just be ‘good enough’ (Silva, 1996). Green & Critchley 
highlights how reductionist tropes cannot deal with the factual complexity of failure to 
protect cases. Critchley is both victim and perpetrator; her identity is shaped by the 
application of tropes of female deviance, glorified maternity, and stereotypical 
notions of domestic violence victims. In legal discourse, the ideal victim of domestic 
violence and the good mother both derive from notions of appropriate femininity 
(although different aspects are emphasised) (Smart, 1992).  
Women who fail to protect their children from harm are subject to glorified 
expectations of them as mothers, traceable to such diverse thinkers as Freud and 
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Rousseau (Badinter, 1980). The good mother of legal discourse is necessarily 
responsible, chaste, and self-sacrificing to the point of masochism (Herring 2007; 
Fineman and Karpin, 1995). As a result, mothers who commit crimes are anti-women 
and ‘anti-mothers’ (Cunliffe, 2011). Tropes of maternal inadequacy are evident in the 
arguments advanced by both prosecutors and defendants, as well as in the 
sentencing comments of judges and, most problematically, in the fabric of the 
offence itself. Failure to protect provisions evince an implicit legal expectation that 
the responsible battered mother should be willing to sacrifice her own life for that of 
her child (Jacobs, 1998).  
In the courtroom, these tropes reinforce the individualisation of responsibility 
for children. Expectations that the good mother is responsible, capable, resilient and 
protective are diametrically opposed to stereotypes of the ideal victim, who is 
frequently portrayed as ‘pathologically weak’, ‘helpless’, ‘dysfunctional’ and passive 
(Mahoney, 1991: 4). A good mother automatically prioritises her child above her own 
wants or needs and it is assumed that she has the emotional and pragmatic 
resources to do this. This assumption is particularly problematic in cases of domestic 
abuse. Parenting within the context of an abusive relationship can lead to a ‘blurring 
of borders’, and an exhaustion arising out of ‘living in the moment where resources 
only allow for dealing with issues as they arise with no time or energy to assess the 
“bigger picture”’ (Mahoney, 1991:21). 
Weait (2007) notes that acting irresponsibly, such as through the taking of 
risks, is criminally punished unless the risk taker is morally innocent.  The 
unwavering level of responsibility and moral superiority expected of mothers means 
that any risk is cast as immoral and therefore susceptible to criminalisation (Cain, 
2016; Friedman, 2014:226). Furthermore, calculations of risk in this context presume 
that, because a woman herself is subject to abuse, she will automatically anticipate 
that her partner will act violently towards their child. This is compounded by 
assumptions that the good mother can be omnipresent to manage risk, or, 
alternatively, that she has the resources and support to leave the relationship. The 
logic of failure to protect discourse fails to appreciate the risks associated with 
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leaving an abusive relationship, including homelessness, accusations of being an 
‘implacably hostile’ mother resulting in the abuser being granted unsupervised 
contact, and even domestic homicide (Wallbank, 1998; Mahoney, 1991).  
 
Constructing Critchley: mother/victim/abuser/other?  
In failure to protect cases, including Green & Critchley, idealised notions of femininity 
and maternity converge to create a culturally familiar stock story for the jury. This 
obscures women’s ‘real’ narratives and denies their agency. Legal discourse 
perpetuates idealised notions of femininity and maternity. Vulnerability has become 
synonymous with being the ideal victim who adheres to strict gender roles and is 
both legally and morally innocent. Brown challenges this ‘vulnerable 
victim’/‘dangerous wrongdoer’ dyad, arguing that, in reality, there is a nexus between 
vulnerability and transgression. In other words, it is possible to be both vulnerable 
and transgressive. To be perceived as vulnerable, one must be willing to disclose a 
great deal of personal information and show ‘compliance’; ie, to be accepting of any 
assistance offered (Brown, 2014). Perversely, though, compliance is hindered by 
cultural assumptions which prevent victims of domestic violence from identifying the 
cause and extent of their vulnerability. In this regard, Mahoney (1991) argues that 
some victims of domestic abuse do not seek, nor do they accept, help because they 
do not identify as victims. This is due to the fact that the victim stereotype is too 
extreme and reductionist to reflect their lived reality. In contrast, their situation feels 
both more trivial and more chaotic.  This is exemplified by Critchley’s nonchalant 
response after Green punched and kicked her on a bus, months after Lia’s death. 
When the bus driver asked her why she ‘put up with it’, she simply replied ‘because 
he’s my boyfriend isn’t he?’.  
Cunliffe’s (2011: 146) contention that ‘the public and legal desperation for 
confession goes far beyond legal strategy’ also plays out in Green & Critchley. 
Green’s guilty plea is synonymous with a confession, which in turn casts Critchley as 
the defendant who is still hiding information and obstructing the truth. Even after 
12 
 
acceptance of Green’s manslaughter plea, the preoccupation of the Crown and the 
police continued to be with why Critchley would not ‘tell the truth’ and blame Green 
for their daughter’s death. This sense of frustration is likely to have been shared by 
the jury who, as Nadler (2012) concludes, are less interested in the defendant’s act 
itself than in the motivation behind that act or, in this case, the failure to act and the 
refusal to incriminate.  
The offence of failure to protect allows guilt to be inferred from silence. 
Critchley’s reluctance to implicate Green is presumed to be meaningful and is 
interpreted as proof of her duplicity.  The provision is intended to compel women like 
Critchley to give evidence and incriminate their partners. Ironically, however, 
elements of the offence silence defendants, disrupts their narratives, and increases 
their reliance on gendered tropes to plug the gaps. Victimhood tropes were never 
raised in the case, as Critchley and Green jointly (and successfully) petitioned for 
evidence of incidents of domestic violence perpetrated against Critchley to be 
excluded (since it would have prejudicially affected both of them). For women, this is 
the ultimate ‘catch 22’: the facts likely to make jurors sympathetic to mothers such as 
Critchley and allow their omissions to be contextualised is the same evidence which 
will incriminate them most forcefully. This form of reasoning ignores the complexities 
of an abusive relationship. It relies on a narrow, individualistic conception of 
autonomy inappropriate in the context of familial abuse, as opposed to a relational 
understanding which recognises that a person’s independent ‘free’ choice always 
operates within a wider framework of practical, emotional and structural constraints 
(Friedman, 2003). 
The narrative which Critchley relied upon in Court -- that she and Green had a 
‘normal’ family life and that she believed Green was a good father who would not 
hurt their children -- appeared disjointed and contained unexplained gaps. As a 
result, she appeared to be deceitful to the jury. For example, one of her colleagues 
gave evidence stating that she had seen holes in the plaster of a living room wall 
which had been caused by a table having being thrown. However, Critchley failed to 
corroborate this, maintaining that Green was not violent towards their children.  The 
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link between duplicity and femininity has a long history throughout mythology and 
theology, and gives rise to the ‘duplicity paradox’: ‘the woman is constructed as 
artifice and marginalised for lacking essence and authenticity’ (Tseelon,1995:5). 
Thus, rather than acknowledging Critchley’s agency, her motives are systematically 
assumed in Court to be duplicitous and thus deserving of punishment. Her acts and 
omissions are systematically stripped of context, allowing guilt to be inferred from her 
silence. It is assumed that she is not telling the truth because she is morally corrupt. 
She failed to protect her child because she is feckless and ambivalent, rather than as 
a consequence of the absence of realistic options. 
This perceived lack of coherence in Critchley’s account is particularly 
prejudicial given the jury’s preference for narratives which are both consistent and 
familiar (Ellison and Munro, 2009; Cunliffe, 2011). Barristers invoking the competing 
tropes at play in a case such as Green & Critchley are so intent on constructing a 
legally and culturally acceptable narrative -- in this case, the feckless teenage 
mother -- that they risk silencing defendants, thereby making the truth even more 
elusive. As Saunders (2012) notes, an account which includes untruths does not 
necessarily render the entire narrative void, yet this does not seem to be appreciated 
in failure to protect discourse. Inconsistencies in Critchley’s account were seen as 
discrediting all of her narrative. She is not lying about some aspects; she is a liar. 
Critchley was depicted as lacking in virtue so that she could be condemned by the 
Crown for ‘play[ing] roulette with [Lia’s] life’. Consequently, Critchley’s vulnerability 
failed to come across in Court. Through her failure to comply -- by not incriminating 
Green -- she is silenced by both the interpretation of the offence and the application 
of cultural tropes. The result is that Critchley is deemed an ‘evil wrongdoer’ rather 
than a ‘vulnerable victim’ (Brown, 2014). 
 
Socio-economic status of mothers who ‘fail to protect’ 
Socio-economic status plays a crucial role in determining which tropes are deployed 
when mothers are on trial. This is because the ideal mother of legal discourse is very 
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much tied to middle class notions of child rearing (Marshall and Woollett, 2000). 
Throughout the hearing, Critchley’s defence strove to portray her as sympathetic, 
whereas the Crown drew on constructs of ‘faulty femininity’ such as promiscuity. This 
allowed for the deployment of the virgin/whore dichotomy in order to depict Critchley 
as an archetypal bad mother. Social class was used in order to distance her from the 
middle class norm, while her infidelity contributed to the theory that she was cunning 
and duplicitous.  
Gender performativity -- the extent to which behaviour conforms to the 
feminine and maternal ideal -- determines which tropes are applicable to mothers 
who fail to protect (Butler, 1990). The intersection of other factors such as age and 
socio-economic status also influence whether women are absolved or vilified 
(Walklate, 2001; Nicholson, 1995). Seal (2012) notes that the only woman to evade 
being construed as mad, bad or victim is the so-called ‘respectable’ woman. Her 
elevated social standing and adherence to heterosexual norms ensures that, despite 
her transgression, she remains within the bounds of appropriate femininity.  
Socio-economic class is highly significant in Green & Critchley. At no point is 
Critchley portrayed as respectable; she is not deemed appropriately feminine; nor 
does she possess appropriate social standing. Instead, she is extremely 
economically vulnerable. The theme of financial struggle pervades the case: 
Critchley regularly borrows money from her family, whether to buy cannabis for 
Green or to recharge the card for their prepaid electricity meter; she falls into arrears 
with nursery fees, which meant that Lia and her sibling were cared for at home for a 
short period whilst Critchley worked; and she often received credit from the local 
shop. This fact was later manipulated to explain Green’s mounting frustration as, 
shortly before he killed Lia, he was either refused credit or found it embarrassing. 
Once again, this exemplifies traditional notions of gender. It is assumed that 
Critchley, as a working mother, would not find relying on credit to be demeaning, 
whereas for Green (despite being unemployed), it is emasculating; a source of 
shame, frustration, and ultimately the cause of his aggression. 
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It is difficult to compare the tropes applied to Critchley with those applied to 
more financially secure women, given the dearth of such cases. From media 
reports6, it appears that economic vulnerability is a significant factor in failure to 
protect cases.  There are two possible explanations as to why a middle class 
comparator is not easy to find. First, respectable middle class women may be 
absolved earlier in the criminal justice process. Women who conform to all other 
aspects of idealised maternity and femininity will be treated more sympathetically 
(Ballinger, 2007). For instance, the police may presume that they are sufficiently 
oppressed by their abuser that it is considered unconscionable to charge them with 
allowing the death of the child for whom they are grieving. Middle class women are 
more likely to be perceived as victims to be pitied, rather than as feckless and 
deserving of punishment, provided that they conform to other feminine and maternal 
ideals (Walklate, 2001; Wells, 2004; Armstrong, 1999)..  
The second explanation is pragmatic: the financial cost of childcare. Lia and 
her sibling usually attended nursery whilst Critchley worked. However, after falling 
into arrears with school fees, both children were cared for by Green and their 
grandmother for two weeks. Lia was due to return to nursery just four days after her 
death.   Anderson (2010: 87) argues that ‘women who are subject to domestic abuse 
are entitled to a network of services including safe housing, financial and 
psychological counselling, legal advocacy and the social support necessary to 
enable them to care for their children’. This is particularly pertinent given the number 
of children (including Lia) who are attacked when their mothers are temporarily 
absent at work or running errands.7 The provision of affordable childcare would 
potentially limit the number of these cases and would represent a better use of public 
money than the prosecution of mothers such as Critchley. 
The middle class mother of legal discourse appears frequently in contexts 
other than failure to protect cases. The recent amendment to the law of neglect 
                                                          
6 Most notably R v Rigby & Smedley (unreported, 2012) (Crown Ct (Manchester Crown Court)) and R v Mujuru [2007] EWCA Crim 1249. 
7 See also R v Mujuru [2007] EWCA Crim 1249 and  R v Lewis (Rebecca) (Unreported, 2006) (Crown Ct(Swansea)) 
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clarifies that harm encompasses psychological harm. Consequently, emotional 
neglect is now criminalised8. Once again, a well-intentioned law which seeks to 
ameliorate the vulnerability of children risks criminalising mothers who are 
themselves vulnerable and in need of support rather than deserving of criminal 
punishment (White et al 2014). While it is increasingly acknowledged that emotional 
neglect has very serious consequences (Piper, 2013), this new offence will most 
likely lead to judgments regarding appropriate levels of maternal emotional care, 
which will again be based upon middle class maternal ideals. 
 
Promiscuity as Provocation 
While Critchley’s socio-economic status can be understood as a factor leading to her 
prosecution, her alleged promiscuity also proves important. To repeat, the 
virgin/whore dyad has proven a persistent feature of legal discourse. The defence 
will cast a defendant as chaste, appropriately feminine, and therefore innocent; 
whereas the prosecution will seize upon any insinuation of sexual desire to argue 
that she is hypersexual and, consequently, guilty (Bell and Fox, 1996; Evans, 2012). 
At the time of Lia’s death, Natalie Critchley was having an affair. Although it was 
established that she had not seen her lover in the days preceding Lia’s death, her 
promiscuity became central to the trial. It was used to portray Critchley as both 
duplicitous and selfish, the opposite of the good mother who is morally superior and 
devoid of desire, be it sexual or otherwise. To bolster this accusation, the Crown 
drew the jury’s attention to the fact that Critchley, for a brief period prior to Lia’s 
death, had worked as a pole dancer.   
Female promiscuity ‘shields’ male co-defendants from scrutiny thereby 
reducing  the blame attributed to men (Winter, 2002:360; Evans, 2012). Hyper-
sexuality is hyper-masculine and therefore an expected male behaviour. By contrast, 
for women such as Critchley, it results in their demonisation. Moreover, because 
hyper-sexuality and violence are associated with masculinity, Green is pathologised; 
                                                          
8 Due to a recent amendment to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 contained in the Serious Crime Act 2015 PT 5 s. 66. 
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he is a victim of his biology in that he cannot help but react violently to her adultery 
(Coates & Wade, 2004). As a result, Critchley’s affair is not only seen as proof of her 
duplicitous nature, but also as the cause and catalyst for Green’s actions. The Crown 
asserted that her affair caused ‘“simmering resentment” [which was] hardly helped 
by the responsibility of having to look after the children’. This narrative of provocation 
became so dominant that Green’s ‘loss of self-control’ was portrayed as being a 
direct result of her promiscuity: 
 
Richard Green on the 29th of last year, you lost all control…your temper was 
not helped by the fact that you strongly - and rightly - suspected that Natalie 
was having an affair with another man.9 
 
Critchley’s infidelity is thus discursively deployed to justify Green’s actions. The 
prosecution’s focus on her affair is particularly problematic since (thanks to decades 
of feminist critique) infidelity no longer provides a ready legal justification for the loss 
of self-control10. Notwithstanding this reform, in failure to protect cases, violence is 
portrayed as an understandable reaction to being cuckolded. 
 
 Dependency and the criminalisation of ‘secondary’ vulnerability 
The current response to abused women who fail to protect their children fails to 
recognise the multiple ways in which caring creates vulnerabilities for the caregiver 
(Kittay, 1999). Kittay describes this dynamic as ‘secondary vulnerability’ in that it 
flows directly from the responsibility for being a main carer. She argues that this 
responsibility for care affects the carer’s autonomy, due to the burden of knowing 
that another is so reliant upon her. For example, Critchley’s decisions were inevitably 
                                                          
9 Judge’s sentencing remarks to Green. 
10 Following the enactment of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. As Wake (2012) however notes although sexual infidelity is not a 
‘qualifying trigger’ the Court of Appeal in R v Clinton & Others [2012] EWCA Crim 2 felt that it should still be taken into consideration if 
‘essential’ to the context of the crime. 
 Even if they do, support is often unavailable/lacking as shown in R v Thornton [1992] 1 All E.R. 306 
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shaped by her caregiving responsibilities. Her vulnerability was thus exacerbated by 
her caring role as mother, combined with the fact that she worked outside of the 
home (Dodds, 2014: 200). In this way, failure to protect truly uncovers the ‘dark’ side 
of care. Despite experiencing domestic abuse, Critchley’s responsibility for 
responding to Lia’s innate vulnerability had become so naturalised that she was 
expected to ensure the safety of her child ‘24/7’, even during her absences from the 
family home due to her work commitments. Lia’s dependency was shouldered 
entirely by her mother and, when Critchley had no choice but to leave her in the care 
of her father, tragedy struck. 
Remarks made to Green in sentencing imply that resentment and anger are 
an understandable reaction by a man forced to care for a sick child. In other words, 
maternal care is portrayed as a moral (and legal) necessity, but paternal care is 
rendered an act of altruism: 
 
You were having to look after your two young children because there was no 
money to send them to nursery. And you resented it. Your partner Natalie 
Critchley, your co-defendant was out at work. So you had to deal with the 
children alone. You were frustrated and angry. 
 
By contrast, during cross-examination of Critchley, her engagement in paid work was 
portrayed as self-indulgent, as well as being symptomatic of her maternal 
ambivalence (Cain, 2016): 
 
Critchley: ‘It was his turn to watch them. I didn’t see why I needed to come out 
of work.’ 
Prosecuting Barrister: ‘So you resisted?’ 
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Critchley: ‘Yes, I was annoyed. … He said “why are you crying, it’s only a 
job” … I thought he should be able to deal with it. I didn’t want nursery to 
know about my life, with him ringing up all the time.’  
(Later) Prosecuting Barrister: ‘I’m suggesting you didn’t want to go home…’ 
Critchley: ‘No I did not want to go home.’  
Prosecuting Barrister: ‘Because you wanted to remain in contact with Mr X 
[Critchley’s lover]?’  
Critchley: ‘No, that’s not why.’ 
Prosecuting barrister: ‘[A witness says] Green presented as a man who 
couldn’t cope, shouting and swearing’… 
Critchley: ‘He always swears everything he says. Couldn’t cope? No, if he 
couldn’t cope I wouldn’t have left him in with two children’. 
 
This naturalisation of responsibility for responding to vulnerability ultimately provides 
the justification for criminalising Critchley’s failure to protect (Walker, 1998). By 
attributing blame to mothers who are themselves subject to abuse, failure to protect 
laws render not only dependency, but also violence and vulnerability, hidden within 
the family. This creates a different kind of public/private divide (Fineman & Mykitiuk, 
1995). While those types of vulnerability which may be visible to the public are seen 
as worthy of state resources, other vulnerabilities, such as those created by care-
giving, are normalised as private and therefore are not seen as warranting the 
financial responsibility of the state.  
 
 
From maternal responsibility to shared vulnerability 
In this section, I argue that shifting the legal focus from maternal responsibility (Cain, 
2016) to vulnerability will promote a more nuanced approach to abusive family 
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dynamics. Not only does the drafting of s 5 implicitly criminalise vulnerability, but in 
addition, current legal expectations of mothers and gendered assumptions about 
care obligations exacerbate vulnerability and justify the criminalisation of mothers 
who fail to protect. Relational vulnerability is a helpful way to frame these cases 
since, as noted by Mackenzie et al (2014), it connotes harm, suffering, dependency 
and care – themes which pervade the failure to protect case law.  
Vulnerability is a universal feature of the human condition in that we are all 
vulnerable as a result of both our corporeality and our social, co-dependent nature 
(Fineman, 2008). By focusing on this context rather than on individual 
characteristics, relational vulnerability helps to unpack issues such as foreseeability 
and responsibility, both of which are key elements of the failure to protect offence. 
After all, to understand a person’s calculation of risk and to decide if they acted 
irresponsibly, we must appreciate the context of their actions and their environment 
(Stychin, 2012).  
Fineman’s (2001:1409) notions of ‘inevitable’ and ‘derivative’ dependency are 
illuminating in the failure to protect scenario. She explains that inevitable 
dependency is caused by age or disability whereas ‘derivative’ dependency is 
perceived culturally as being preventable; for example, dependency on the welfare 
state. Fineman argues that inevitable dependency attracts a sympathetic response, 
both culturally and from the state and its institutions. By contrast, derivative 
dependency is perceived as considerably less worthy of sympathy and resources 
(Fineman, 1995). Failure to protect laws certainly seek to protect the ‘inevitable’ 
dependency of children. However, by refusing to acknowledge the impact of abuse 
on the choices and actions of women, the criminal justice system simultaneously 
punishes the ‘derivative’ (or ‘secondary’) dependency of abused mothers (Fineman, 
2010).  
I want to suggest that a vulnerability analysis makes three main contributions 
to this debate. First, by shifting the focus onto the person who is creating and 
exacerbating the vulnerabilities of mother and child, it challenges the 
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victim/perpetrator dichotomy. This dyad is a result of, and perpetuates, the idea that 
to be recognised as a victim, one must adhere to a set of gendered ideals. Second, 
recognising the impact of domestic abuse necessitates the reconsideration of the 
attribution of legal culpability and moral blameworthiness on abused mothers who fail 
to protect. Finally, a relational approach resists the ‘othering’ of these abused 
women; rather, it aids in the deconstruction of the dichotomies which provide the 
basis for longstanding gendered tropes that have silenced them. Diminishing the 
power of these tropes thereby will allow women the space to give a contextualised 
account of their actions, and hopefully will lead to their treatment as autonomous 
agents rather than as pathological failures. Furthermore, emphasising the 
universality of vulnerability challenges the feminisation of vulnerability, which derives 
from the fallacy of the autonomous, invulnerable male legal subject. I want now to 
expand on each of these claims. 
 
1. Shifting focus from the gender performativity of the mother to the actions of the 
perpetrator 
A vulnerability approach ensures that attention remains firmly on the perpetrator 
rather than primarily analysing the actions or inactions of the victim (Stanko, 2014). 
In the context of failure to protect, this would mark a paradigm shift. Instead of 
scrutinising the moral and legal blameworthiness of women such as Critchley, who 
have themselves been subject to abuse, the focus shifts to the perpetrators of 
violence and how they have exploited the vulnerabilities of partners and children. 
This leaves space for an examination of the context in which omissions have 
occurred and for understanding the coercion that may have affected women’s 
decisions. 
 
2. A reconsideration of the legal culpability and moral blameworthiness of abused 
women who fail to protect their children 
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Acknowledging the vulnerability of abused women who have failed to protect their 
children renders the pursuit of criminal prosecutions of them undesirable. It also has 
implications regarding whether they are seen as morally blameworthy. Friedman 
(2014) has explored what vulnerability analysis brings to the issue of attributing 
moral responsibility to mothers. Acknowledging the level of coercion inherent in 
abusive relationships, she considers whether this justifies a woman’s failure to 
protect or whether it excuses or exempts her from moral responsibility. Friedman 
concludes that the abusive context excuses women of moral responsibility on the 
basis that ‘we accept that the act of the failing to protect was wrong but 
understandable if the woman concerned is in fear of serious harm herself’ 
(Friedman, 2014:23).  
Whilst I agree that domestic violence should lessen not only the legal but also 
the moral accountability of mothers, these assumptions are overly simplistic given 
that Friedman herself recognises a complex dynamic of coercion. ‘Excusing’ abused 
women for their failure to protect on account of their compromised moral agency fails 
to address the implicit assumption behind the failure to protect law: not only the 
implicit expectation of self-sacrifice but also of omnipresence. Friedman’s assertion 
that domestic violence ‘excuses’ mothers such as Critchley from moral responsibility 
remains focused on the failures of the mother, and the ‘excusing’ of her 
shortcomings. But vulnerability analysis leads to a further means of conceptualising 
whether women are blameworthy; namely, it allows women to ‘explain’. That is, it 
begins to shift the focus from her failure to what is wrong with her situation. By 
exploring the context surrounding Critchley’s omission, and specifically by looking at 
how Green exacerbated her vulnerability, Critchley’s lack of resilience may become 
explicable.  
Not only would this approach make the criminalisation of failure to protect 
more obviously undesirable, it would also diminish what Lacey and Pickard (2013) 
call ‘affective blame’, meaning the hostile emotions associated with 
blameworthiness. Affective blame is particularly problematic in failure to protect 
cases, not only with respect to members of the jury, but also with the wider public. 
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For example, women who have been acquitted often have to deal with the hostile 
reactions of their local communities. This can have tragic consequences, such as in 
the case of the death of Danah Vince, who committed suicide following her acquittal 
of the offence of causing or allowing the death of her sixteen week old daughter. This 
resulted from her being subjected to taunts such as ‘baby killer’ from members of the 
general public (BBC, 2015). 
 
3. Challenging the denial of female agency; diminishing the power of pathologising 
gender tropes 
In Green & Critchley, a focus on the actions of Green would significantly diminish the 
power of pathologising tropes, as it would direct attention to Critchley’s 
circumstances, rather than attributing failure to her as a personal, internalised 
matter. Victim blaming frequently stems from a tendency to scrutinise the behaviour 
and character of the victim rather than the assailant. By adopting a vulnerability 
approach, previously ‘relevant’ factors which encourage victim blaming (such as drug 
or alcohol consumption or even mode of dress) become irrelevant (CPS 2015; 
Stanko 1982; Stanko 2014). In the context of failure to protect, this paradigm shift 
diminishes the power of gender tropes in the courtroom. Under a vulnerability 
framework, Critchley’s alleged promiscuity loses its significance, as the focus shifts 
to Green’s manipulation of the vulnerability of both Lia and her mother. The 
dichotomies of mad/bad and virgin/whore thereby become irrelevant. Fundamentally, 
emphasising the universality of vulnerability begins the task of unpicking the archaic 
pairing of femininity with vulnerability and masculinity with invulnerability (Scott, 
2014; Clowes, 2013). The feminisation of vulnerability reifies gender stereotypes and 
perpetuates gendered narratives. These tropes then come to dominate legal 
discourse and they silence women, deny them agency, and further exacerbate their 
vulnerability. 
By contrast, Rowbotham (2011:115) suggests that the solution is ‘for the 
criminal justice system to develop a conscious awareness of [gender stereotyping]’. 
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She argues that it is theoretically and practically impossible to entirely resist its pull. 
From my courtroom observation, however, legal professionals appear to be acutely 
aware of the role which gender (and maternal) stereotyping can play in these cases. 
Critchley wore a black trouser suit every day of the trial, aside from the day when 
she was cross-examined. On that occasion, she wore a black pencil skirt and 
cardigan, leading the Detective Chief Inspector to remark on her ‘mumsy’ change of 
dress.  Vulnerability theory assists in understanding why this comment was 
inappropriate. It highlights the need for a cultural shift whereby gender stereotypes 
are not par for the course and, in turn, will no longer be seen as an inevitable aspect 
of courtroom rhetoric (Bell and Fox, 1996). 
Just as legal professionals seem well aware of the manipulation of gender 
stereotypes, jurors could be made more aware of this aspect of the current legal 
process. At present, gendered discourse is so dominant that juries are not 
adequately equipped to be able to distinguish between the failure to live up to a 
stereotypical ideal, and the failure to protect from harm. It has been established that, 
when assessing the credibility of a witness’ account, jurors cannot divorce their 
decision making from their stereotypical preconceptions of the ideal victim. In the 
context of failure to protect, that is the construction of the ideal mother (Ellison and 
Munro 2009). Judges also need to be mindful of this in their summing up, because 
they can affirm or undermine the narratives presented by the prosecution and 
defence and thereby shape the verdict of the jury (Winter, 2002). 
 
From theory to practice; avoiding ‘violent protectionism’11 
While vulnerability may be theoretically attractive, its transition from theory to 
practice has proven problematic (Brown, 2014; Kohn, 2014). The word vulnerability 
is frequently co-opted by governments in order to regulate behaviour which they 
determine to be undesirable, such as sex work or BDSM (Cowan, 2012; Fitzgerald 
and Munro, 2012). Furthermore, even well-intentioned state responses to social 
                                                          
11 Murphy, 2012 
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issues are usually based on problematic identity based notions of vulnerability which 
are grounded in the fallacy that vulnerability is something particular, temporary, and 
capable of being overcome and eradicated. A ‘vulnerable group’ is identified on the 
basis of a shared characteristic or status, such as age, race, or social class. Once 
identified, it is frequently subjected to paternalistic, unwanted, and at times 
aggressive intervention in a naive attempt to ameliorate the particular group’s 
vulnerability (Murphy, 2012). In the context of failure to protect, children are the 
vulnerable group whose inevitable vulnerability must be ameliorated. However, s 5 is 
pathogenic as the substance and discourse surrounding the offence creates and 
exacerbates the vulnerabilities of the children’s abused mothers (Mackenzie et al. 
2014:9). 
Furthermore, identity based constructs of vulnerability lend themselves to 
‘othering’. That is, they perpetuate the dichotomies from which gendered tropes 
flourish (male/female; mother/child; good/bad mother). Ignoring the relationality 
between men and women, and between mothers and their children, exacerbates 
vulnerability (Todres, 2009). Denying the interconnectedness between abused 
mothers and their children increases ‘maternal alienation’ (Morris, 1999). 
Motherhood and domestic violence are both potentially isolating experiences and a 
combination of the two means that women are unlikely to seek support. They are 
thus more likely to remain in abusive relationships, which may culminate in the sort 
of tragedy which this article has documented, where the abuser suddenly vents his 
anger or frustration on the child, rather than the mother.  
Fineman challenges the conventional construct of vulnerability as an 
undesirable and avoidable characteristic or status of the individual. Instead, she 
emphasises its universality and inevitability (see also Naffine, 2003). In order to 
avoid paternalism, vulnerability theory must remain relational as well as context 
driven, rather than status based. Like resilience, vulnerability depends upon 
constellations of external factors (such as our relationships and our environment). It 
is not attributable to a particular characteristic, such as age, race or class. A 
relational approach not only takes into account systemic inequalities in the wider 
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society, but it also examines inequality within personal relationships (Kabeer, 2014). 
By recognising that our vulnerability and resilience are dependent on those around 
us (Goodin, 1986), we can build a ‘reconceptualised relationship between the self 
and other’ (Boon, 2013). A relational vulnerability approach shifts attention to how 
the abuse which has been suffered has compromised the resilience of both mother 
and child, ensuring that the interests of children are no longer seen as oppositional 
to, or disconnected from, the interests of their abused mothers (Lapierre, 2008; 
Herring, 2007).  
Problematic interventions are often the result of well intentioned attempts to 
completely ameliorate vulnerability. This stems from the misconception that the 
opposite of vulnerability is invulnerability. But the eradication of vulnerability is an 
unachievable aim. Whilst our vulnerabilities may change in nature and extent over 
our lifetime, we can never become completely invulnerable. Consequently, when 
used in a reactionary way, such projects almost always descend into paternalistic 
interventions aimed at identity based constructs (Kohn, 2014; Herring 2012). 
Fineman makes an important distinction here between ameliorating vulnerability and 
building resilience. As vulnerability is universal and inevitable, it cannot be escaped. 
Resilience, however, can be bolstered (2008;10). If we accept that the opposite of 
vulnerability is resilience, then the focus of social policy becomes fostering 
resilience, rather than seeking to reduce the vulnerabilities of any particular group.  
Fineman’s theory avoids the individualisation and privatisation of responsibility 
(which currently underpins the law on failure to protect) by shifting our attention to 
the important role that the policies of the state should play in building the resilience 
of its citizens (Fineman, 2008; Ramsay, 2013). She criticises the way in which, within 
capitalist societies, the market is now dominant and the role of the state has been 
diminished. Concerns over privacy detract from the state’s important function in 
empowering its citizens. Fineman calls for a more responsive, non-authoritarian 
state, which takes power back from the market and recognises its own role in 
fostering resilience (Fineman, 2008).  
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Applying this analysis, we can conclude that failure to protect provisions can 
never completely ameliorate the inevitable vulnerability of children, as vulnerability is 
both universal and unavoidable. However, state initiatives that help to build resilience 
in women and children are currently being cut as they are no longer a government 
priority. For example, ‘Sure Start’ centres build resilience by offering support to both 
parents and children. Whilst the number of families using these services has grown 
steadily year on year (with over one million children and families currently using 
‘Sure Start’ centres in the UK (4Children, 2015)), funds have been cut annually since 
2012. This has led to the closure of hundreds of centres, and shorter opening hours 
for those that remain combined with a reduction in services (particularly domestic 
violence support). At best, this policy development is ill conceived; at worst, it reflects 
the state’s attempt to ensure that vulnerability is understood as a private issue, 
rather than as a public concern.  
Criminalising mothers for failing to protect their children makes it clear that the 
vulnerability of children is the responsibility of mothers, and thereby limits the state’s 
responsibility for the protection of women and children (Herring, 2007). Furthermore, 
it can be argued that, in this context, particular vulnerability is criminalised in order to 
protect vulnerable institutions (Fineman, 2010:37). For example, the criminal justice 
system and child protection services today can both be considered vulnerable, given 
that they are overburdened and under-resourced. As institutions, they are only 
sustainable if the majority of the population abide by the law and do not need to call 
upon family support. 
 
Conclusions 
In this article, I have argued that identity based constructs of vulnerability and 
glorified notions of motherhood have led to the adoption of failure to protect laws. 
These create, perpetuate and exacerbate the condition of vulnerability, rather than 
fostering resilience. Although children undoubtedly are vulnerable, this does not 
justify the imposition of a regime which punishes victims of domestic abuse. The 
offence of failure to protect is pathogenic in that it manipulates and exacerbates the 
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vulnerability of abused mothers who are charged with this crime. The law embodies 
the opposite of Fineman’s call for a non-authoritarian responsive state which strives 
to empower its citizens. Instead, the current approach is punitive and coercive. In 
short, the law should not apply where there is evidence of domestic violence towards 
the defendant. Women who have lost their children at the hands of their partners 
should be able to disclose their experiences of domestic abuse without fear that this 
will be used against them to prove their failure to protect in law.  
Charging mothers with this offence risks further ruining the lives of women 
who are themselves victims of abuse. Even if acquitted, a woman may be prevented 
from regaining custody of any surviving children, gaining custody of any future 
children,12 or being able to work with children. The discourse surrounding failure to 
protect is also problematic because it illustrates law’s continued reliance on 
antiquated tropes which deny women’s agency. It creates the impression that their 
failure is a result of something inherently wrong with them rather than something 
wrong with the context in which they were attempting to parent. Damaging tropes of 
femininity, maternity and victimhood all converge in these cases, rendering the 
circumstances of the omission irrelevant. A failure to meet a glorified standard of 
motherhood should not be synonymous with a failure to protect in law. It is not a 
justification for criminalising vulnerability.  
A shift towards a more nuanced approach, which takes account of parties’ 
relational vulnerability, focuses on the party who has exacerbated or manipulated the 
vulnerability of both mother and child. This reduces the likelihood of legal culpability 
for abused mothers by rendering prosecution undesirable. Furthermore, a more 
holistic approach which takes into account the circumstances in which women were 
attempting to parent helps to explain their actions and omissions, lessening the 
moral blame attributed to them.  In allowing mothers such as Critchley to disclose the 
abuse they have suffered, women’s actions and omissions are afforded context. This 
creates space for sympathetic reactions and lessens the reliance on gendered 
tropes. By deconstructing the gendered nature of vulnerability and resilience, this 
                                                          
12 Re J (Children) [2013] UKSC 9 
29 
 
approach also destabilises the cornerstone of criminal law, namely, the invulnerable 
male legal subject. Furthermore, this shift challenges traditional constructs of 
femininity and this may lead to discursive gains for women, not just in failure to 
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